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These are good days for ordinary language philosophy (OLP). The last few 
years have seen the appearance of compelling books by Avner Baz and San-
dra Laugier defending a kind of philosophical attention to the “ordinary” 
derived from the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and Stanley 
Cavell. While those were books written by philosophers and mainly aimed at 
an audience of philosophers, Toril Moi’s new book, Revolution of the Ordinary: 
Literary Studies after Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, undertakes an affiliated 
project for literary studies: a response to misconceptions of OLP pervasive 
among literary theorists, and a case for the distinctive contribution that OLP 
can make to our understanding of our relations to literary texts. The effect is 
a book that not only demonstrates an encyclopedic familiarity with the work 
of the philosophers of its subtitle (and with the secondary literature on those 
philosophers), but also expands most received conceptions of OLP, so that 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Iris Murdoch, Simone Weil, Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
most importantly Simone de Beauvoir all plausibly emerge as philosophers of 
the “ordinary.” This expanded conception of OLP largely results from Moi’s 
attempts to procure more ethical and political significance from OLP than 
might be apparent to, say, a casual reader of Austin and Wittgenstein. This is 
an important project, and Moi’s work raises several questions that will shape 
future work in the field.
Before turning to some of those questions, I want to convey, by way of 
rough summary, the scope of Moi’s book: a scope that testifies to how much 
can result from conscientiously reading, as Moi does in her first chapter, the 
opening passages of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Indeed, Moi’s first 
chapter (“Five Red Apples”) is a particularly excellent introduction to those 
passages—and to Wittgenstein’s notion that “to imagine a language means 
to imagine a form of life” (PI §19)—strengthened by Moi’s juxtaposition of 
them with a scene involving language-learning and the distinctive vocabulary 
of bullfighting in Julio Cortázar’s novel A Certain Lucas (Un tal Lucas). More-
over, Moi’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s opposition to the “Augustinian” 
picture of language (whereby the relationship between words and the world 
is principally representational) supplies her accounts of several important 
moments in literary theory, all of which she thinks have somehow involved 
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variations on the Augustinian picture: Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in Gen-
eral Linguistics (1916); the emergence of a “post-Saussurean” tradition (as in 
Émile Beneviste’s reading of Saussure and Vicki Kirby’s use of Beneviste in 
her “new materialism”); and even Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’s 
“Against Theory” (1982). Moi also elaborates on conflicts between OLP and 
the view of concepts at play in Derridean deconstruction; between OLP and 
the kinds of lessons about the relation between grammar and rhetoric that 
Paul de Man tries to draw from a scene from All in the Family (in his “Semiol-
ogy and Rhetoric” [1973]); and between OLP and such critics of its supposed 
conservativism as Ernest Gellner and Herbert Marcuse.
In its last third the book takes the ethical and political turn prepared for 
throughout it, with Moi using Cavell’s notion of “acknowledgment” to develop 
an ethics of reading meant to contrast with the “hermeneutics of suspicion” 
(as in her chapter “Reading as a Practice of Acknowledgment”). Moi takes 
this still further in her elegiac and personal final chapter on the ethics of 
attention, based on a pamphlet in Norwegian written from her experience 
attending parts of the trial of the right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik 
for his July 22, 2011 attacks in Oslo and Utøya, Norway, in which he killed 
77 people.
A consistent theme of Moi’s book is OLP’s attention to particulars. It should 
be clear that “attention to particulars” cannot exclude placing certain particu-
lars in wider contexts, including social practices, that are in a sense “prior” 
to those particulars. Thus, in a famous Wittgenstein-inspired discussion of 
social practices, John Rawls notes that though outside a baseball game one 
can “swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood,” no “matter what a person did 
he could not be described as stealing base or striking out or drawing a walk 
unless he could also be described as playing baseball.” Rawls concludes, “The 
practice is prior to particular cases: unless there is the practice, the terms 
referring to actions specified by it lack sense” (“Two Concepts of Rules” 25). 
It is doubtful that, as a Wittgensteinian, Moi would want to exclude such 
ideas in her invocations of “particulars.”1 (For example, she says that the point 
of Wittgenstein’s using the term “language-game” is “to draw attention to the 
intertwinement of words and practices, to show us that we can’t understand a 
word or an utterance unless we understand the practice it is a part of” [Moi 
44].) Her interest lies rather in how much theory-building is (in contrast) 
rooted in what Wittgenstein called “our craving for generality” (Blue Book 17). 
As her main case study of such tendencies, Moi takes up the rise of “intersec-
tionality theory,” particularly in feminist theory, since Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
1989 discussion of how Black women find themselves at the “intersection” of 
multiple forms of oppression. According to Moi, the intersectionality theorist’s 
1Cavell’s critical discussion of Rawls’s paper in The Claim of Reason consists not in 
disputing such an idea of the relationship between particulars and practices (304), 
but in questioning Rawls’s understanding of certain moral phenomena (principally 
promising) as practices in a sense derived from the model of games (292–312).
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concern with avoiding “exclusionary” concepts not only manifests a yearning 
for generality, but also renders the term effectively meaningless: if “all identi-
ties are intersectional, the term does no work” (106).
To assess the full significance of Moi’s arguments, it would be helpful to 
bring them into conversation with recent criticisms of intersectionality theory 
by Marxist social reproduction theorists: for example, David McNally’s recent 
argument that intersectionality theory’s reliance on geometric metaphors 
(suggesting qualitatively independent lines “in intersection”) distorts the way 
in which different forms of oppression qualitatively depend on each other, 
much like the different parts of an organic system. Moi would (I suspect) 
see McNally’s Hegel-inspired treatment of social phenomena in terms of an 
organic “totality” as a further expression of the theorist’s “craving for general-
ity.” And yet when Moi says that she also wants to account for how women’s 
oppression is “stunningly systematic . . . just like a language,” and when she 
cites Beauvoir’s similarly Hegel-inspired The Second Sex (1949) as her main 
example of a systematic but particular-oriented investigation of oppression, 
we might wonder whether we are converging on similar points from different 
traditions, and also wonder what is at stake in using language as opposed to 
life (i.e. the organic) as our principal model for understanding oppression’s 
systematic diversity (108, 109–110).
In another important part of Revolution of the Ordinary, Moi marshals OLP 
against the so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion,” and against the idea that a 
text must be understood as consisting of “surface” and of “depth.” This discus-
sion contains a number of compelling proposals, including the idea that it is 
distorting to talk about approaching a text “suspiciously” as though that were 
a settled or prescribed method, as opposed to just reading with a suspicious 
attitude or according to a certain field of interests (179); as well as the idea 
that it is an evasion of one’s responsibility for reading a text to think that an 
attitude of suspicion can (as though it were a settled or prescribed method) 
simply supply one with an understanding of that text (180). This results in 
a thought-provoking treatment of Freud’s dream-interpretation as itself just 
reading (without needing reference to surface, depth, or suspicion [185–8]).
Moi also regularly draws a stark opposition between OLP and certain 
figures associated with the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” especially Herbert 
Marcuse, who upbraided Austin and Wittgenstein in One-Dimensional Man for 
supposedly enforcing social conformity. Regarding Marcuse’s differences with 
Wittgenstein, Moi says, “This is a clash of radically different philosophical 
sensibilities . . . Marcuse champions the hidden and the deep. Wittgenstein 
yearns for clarity . . . I am not sure that such an abyss can be bridged. It cer-
tainly can’t be bridged by simple persuasion” (Moi 150–51). But it is hard to 
see how this degree of emphasis on Marcuse’s differences from Wittgenstein 
(and Austin) is consistent not only with Moi’s (correct) claims that Marcuse 
misread those philosophers, but also with her (similarly correct) claims that 
Marcuse misunderstood the extent to which both Wittgenstein and Austin 
shared some of his own critical ambitions, especially his opposition to “posi-
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tivism” (160–62). Once we stress this as a matter of misinterpretation rather 
than just a matter of irreconcilable philosophical sensibilities, it becomes easier 
to understand why Marcuse endorsed some of Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical ambitions (such as an analysis of ordinary discourse) in the 
course of criticizing them for supposedly not fulfilling those same aims (202). 
And it is tempting to think that at least some of this mis-encounter between 
Marcuse and OLP might have been averted had Marcuse only awaited Cavell’s 
readings of Austin and Wittgenstein—especially Cavell’s vision of Philosophi-
cal Investigations as revealing the everyday to be a pervasive “scene of illusion 
and trance and artificiality”—and perhaps had Marcuse seen in Cavell their 
shared dedication to non-conformity (Cavell 46).2
It is exactly because I have found it rewarding to think through such differ-
ences with Moi (as well as our many other areas of agreement), that I have 
found it rewarding to work through Revolution of the Ordinary. Moi’s book is 
evidently written from a deep understanding of what leads philosophers and 
theorists to disagree; with an attention to examples that often goes much 
deeper than even that of the authors who first proffered those examples; out 
of a comprehensive acquaintance with OLP, and writing on OLP, that has 
opened many new texts to me; and that results in a convincing presentation 
of the misconceptions about OLP in literary studies that Moi productively 
combats. I hope it is widely read.3
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